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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 16-4263 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
JOSE ALBERTO ROSARIO-MORALES 
a/k/a Miguel Hidalgo-Santos 
a/k/a Luis Santos 
 
      Jose Alberto Rosario-Morales, 
                         Appellant  
 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-16-cr-00240-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 13, 2017 
 
Before: MCKEE, AMBRO, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 4, 2017) 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Jose Rosario-Morales, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, pled guilty to illegal 
reentry in the United States after being previously removed, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1326(a) and (b)(2).  The suggested Guidelines range for his particular conviction was 
15 to 21 months, but the Probation Office determined that an upward variance was 
warranted given that, among other things, Rosario-Morales had repeatedly entered the 
U.S. illegally, consistently failed to appear at immigration proceedings, and was a 
fugitive for eight years.  The Government thus moved for an unspecified upward 
variance, and the District Court imposed a sentence of 42 months.  Rosario-Morales 
challenges that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. He argues that, in imposing 
the sentence with an upward variance, the District Court incorrectly decided that the need 
to do so was to reflect the seriousness of the offense and promote deterrence.  Because 
the Guidelines range for this offense is designed to accomplish those twin aims, he 
contends that the upward variance was substantively unreasonable.  He is incorrect. 
 We review a district court’s sentencing decision for substantive unreasonableness 
under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (en banc).  “The touchstone of ‘reasonableness’ is whether the record as a 
whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(citation omitted).  “[I]f the district court’s sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm 
it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that 
particular defendant for the reasons that the district court provided.”  Tomko¸ 562 F.3d at 
3 
 
568.  In evaluating a substantive unreasonableness challenge, we “may not apply a 
presumption of unreasonableness” if “the sentence is outside the Guidelines range,” but 
instead “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, 
on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.”  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 
(2007). 
 Here, the District Court properly weighed the § 3553(a) factors in imposing a 
sentence with an upward variance, determining that the Guidelines range insufficiently 
reflected Rosario-Morales’s history of unlawful activity surrounding this particular 
offense.  Although not convicted, he had illegally entered the United States and had been 
removed on three previous occasions.  He had not appeared at administrative immigration 
proceedings twice, leading to his fugitive status that he retained for eight years before the 
Government finally discovered him.  He also was convicted of a previous drug offense.  
These are “the nature and circumstances of the offense” and “history and characteristics 
of the defendant” that § 3553(a) requires a district court to consider at sentencing, 
permitting it to impose a variance when appropriate.  In light of these factors, we do not 
think that no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed this sentence for the 
reasons provided.  See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  And although Rosario-Morales insists 
that the Court impermissibly considered that the current offense involved discovery of a 
large amount of heroin (for which he was not charged), it stated on the record that it was 
not taking into account for sentencing purposes the drugs found. 
 Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion.  We thus affirm. 
